Political Islam

Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform?

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HAMAS: Legitimate Heir of Palestinian Nationalism?

Jean-François Legrain

Since the end of the 1970s, Islamism has become a major component in the social and political life of most Arab states. In Palestine, however, the particular circumstances of occupation delayed this ideological and political phenomenon. Indeed, until recently, the absence of a proper state made nationalist ideology exceptionally durable, allowing the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the embodiment of nationalist identity in the quest for national liberation, to maintain itself as the undisputed "only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." Although almost absent from the Palestinian public scene ten years ago, Islamism has now become a major political force in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip at the expense of the PLO. It has also shown itself to be a first-rate military force in terms of the number of operations it has carried out and its ability to identify and hit sensitive Israeli targets.

To accomplish this goal, the Muslim Brotherhood, the most popular Islamist organization in Palestine, had to end two decades of Islamic anti-Israeli inactivity. The 1987 explosion of the uprising (or intifada) left no other choice and, in 1988, the Brotherhood joined the active resistance against the occupation, an arena in which the Islamic Jihad trend had been a forerunner since the early 1980s. The Movement of Islamic Resistance (HAMAS), which was founded by the Muslim Brotherhood to mobilize the resistance, has profited from the union of patriotism (wataniyyah) and religion (dawa), blending moral and financial probity, military expertise, and political skill. Sixteen months after the signing of the Peace Accords in Washington on 13 September 1993, HAMAS imposed itself as the main opposition force to the Accords' terms of self-rule.

The evident success of HAMAS shows that the Islamist movement can no longer be analyzed as an epiphenomenon or the fruit of an ephemeral frustration. This chapter examines the context of the origins of the Islamist

movement and explains how it took root in the political field and has endured within the framework of self-rule. Because the centrality of HAMAS is an established fact today, the analysis will also point to some of HAMAS's internal contradictions. The merging of political and military policies while reconciling Islamism with nationalism are highlighted as the sine qua non conditions of HAMAS's success in assuming the heritage of the former nationalist leader, the PLO.

The Establishment of the Islamist Movement in the Political Arena

Protesting twenty years of Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the intifada, a movement of violent and general anti-Israeli resistance, broke with the PLO's strategy of managing a "normalized" occupation of the territories, thereby ushering in a new era in the history of the Palestinian people. Under the auspices of the PLO, resistance existed, but only in specific conditions of time, place, and social group. Ending the occupation was conceptualized exclusively in military terms and therefore postponed, on the basis of successive Palestinian defeats. By contrast, the intifada planned the uprising of the whole society, seizing and appropriating the political initiative of the population inside the West Bank and Gaza, which had been, until then, left in the hands of the PLO leadership, located outside of the Occupied Territories.

In early 1988, the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), which had been established by second-rank followers of the PLO in Gaza and Jerusalem, began to give shape to this goal of seizing the political initiative. The UNLU had coined the catch phrases that defined the uprising as an antioccupation movement, "a revolt of stones and molotovs" restricted to the occupied territories that was to be based on civil disobedience and the demand that a Palestinian state be established alongside Israel.[1]

But even though the intifada, as a mechanism for political mobilization, emanated from nationalist ranks, the spark that ignited it came from the Islamists. Because of its numerous armed operations in 1986–1987 in the name of Islam, the Islamic Jihad movement constituted the major factor in transforming the passive suffering caused by the occupation into violent action against it.[2] The Islamic Jihad thus emphasized its founding principle: The Palestinian cause is central to the Islamist cause. Conceived in the late 1970s in Egyptian universities by Fathi Shiqaqi, a physician from Rafiah (south of Gaza), and Bashir Nafi, a biologist, Islamic Jihad considers Zionism and Israeli occupation an obstacle that cannot be ignored in the process of re-Islamization. Therefore, the destruction of Israel is an immediate and individual Islamic duty.[3] Based on the quranic commentary of

Shaikh Asad al-Tamimi, a former preacher at al-Aqsa mosque who has lived in Amman since 1967, Israel's destruction is as inevitable as the carrying out of divinely imposed religious duties by every believer.[4] Therefore, according to the Islamic Jihad, the liberation of Palestine is an immediate personal obligation (fard al-ain) for all Muslims, regardless of where they live. Because their lives are centered around a deeply rooted faith, Muslims do not need a sophisticated organizational apparatus to carry out acts of liberation. Rather, they are able to operate through very small and autonomous cells organized around a shaikh.

In its military strategies to achieve the Palestinian cause, the Islamic Jihad inside the Occupied Territories learned from the experience of detainees freed during the exchange of prisoners in May 1985 between Israel and the PFL-GC (Popular Forces of Liberation of Palestine–General Council) of Ahmad Jibril. Most of the Palestinian detainees were former activists of the PFL and members of an Islamic group (al-Jamaah al-Islamiyyah) that was founded by Jabr Ammar when he was in jail in the 1970s.[5] At the same time, outside the Territories, some high-ranking officers of Fatah independently set up the Islamic Jihad Brigades (Sarayat al-Jihad al-Islami), presumably without the knowledge of their superiors. Thanks to these experiences, in 1986 and 1987, the Islamic Jihad stepped up anti-Israeli military operations inside the Occupied Territories. The first serious act occurred on 15 October 1986, when a commando of the Jihad Brigades threw grenades at new recruits of an elite unit of the Israeli army at the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem. After six members of the Jihad escaped from Gaza's central prison in May 1987, several armed operations, including the assassination of the chief of the military police in Gaza, fueled a succession of massive popular anti-Israeli demonstrations. The killing of four Jihad militants on 6 October 1987 and the accidental death of Palestinian workers on 8 December 1987 are commonly held to mark the beginning of the intifada.[6]

Despite Israeli repression at the very beginning of the uprising and the hampering of its cellular and factional modes of operation, Islamic Jihad as an organization failed to become the catalyst for the reconciliation of patriotism and religion. In 1994, public opinion polls indicated that support for Islamic Jihad averaged about 2 to 5 percent. Fifteen years after its emergence, Islamic Jihad split into several rival organizations, of which only the Islamic Jihad Movement (IJM) in Palestine (Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami fi Filastin) has any real popular base in the Occupied Territories. It is also the only jihad organization that is still outside of the PLO's range. From its founding in the early 1980s, it was headed by Fathi Shiqaqi, who was deported by Israel in 1988 and assassinated in Malta in 1995.[7] This organization is opposed to the Oslo agreement, and it still conducts military operations against Israel.

All the other jihad organizations either disappeared or were merged

into the PLO, according to a plan implemented by the Islamists and Fatah. The most significant military movement, the Islamic Jihad Brigades, was established in the mid-1980s by Hamdi Sultan al-Tamimi and Abu Hasan Qasim (Muhammad Al-Bhayss), two Fatah officers close to Abu Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir, the former second in command of the PLO, who was assassinated in Tunis in April 1988). Responsible for several deadly operations in 1986–1987, the Brigades almost disappeared after the assassination of their leaders in Limassol (Cyprus) in February 1988. Since then, headed by Jihad Amarayn, the Brigades were integrated into Fatah and seem to be dormant.

The Fighting Islamic Tendency (al-Ittijah al-Islami al-Mujahid) was founded by Munir Shafiq (an intellectual, a former Maoist from a Christian family, and former head of the Planning Center of the PLO) as the political wing of the Islamic Jihad Brigades and as the liaison with the Movement of Islamic Jihad in Palestine. It disappeared in 1988 after the assassination of the Brigades' leaders and after Shiqaqi claimed complete autonomy of decisionmaking. Munir Shafiq then became associated with HAMAS.

The Islamic Jihad Movement (IJM)–Jerusalem (Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami–Bayt al-Maqdis) is headed in Amman by Shaikh Asad al-Tamimi. Although Shaikh Asad played a part in its ideological formation, he failed to become an organizational leader when Fathi Shiqaqi left to found his own group. A personal friend of Yasir Arafat, Shaikh Asad served as an Islamic cautionary to Fatah's leader in the late 1980s and early 1990s and as a go-between with Abu Nidal's faction in Lebanon. The movement became inactive after condemning the Oslo agreement and freezing its participation with the PLO.

The Islamic Jihad Movement for the Liberation of Palestine–al-Aqsa Battalions (Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami li-Tahrir Filastin–Kataib al-Aqsa), which left the IJM–Jerusalem in the early 1990s, split into two factions: one, headed by Shaikh Fayiz Abu Abd Allah al-Aswad, who dismissed his rival Ibrahim Sirbil in 1992, operates from Gaza as a component of the PLO; the other one, resulting from the split that occurred in October 1994, was headed by Shaikh Husayn Anbar, who dismissed al-Aswad and criticized the financial and political conduct of the PLO from Khartoum and Algiers, although it did not withdraw from the organization. The short-lived Hizbollah-Palestine (Hizb Allah-Filastin), headed by Ahmad Muhanna, a former military officer of IJM in Palestine and then of IJM–Jerusalem, was a pro-Iranian and pro-Syrian group in the early 1990s.

Despite its small size and structural problems, since the mid-1980s, the Islamic Jihad movement has foreshadowed such current trends in ideology and mobilization as the retreat of Arab nationalism and the forging of new alliances between local patriotism and religion by committing itself militarily in the name of Islam. Consequently, the Islamic Jihad movement legitimated the Islamist movement as a whole through its links to patriotism (wataniyyah) rather than to nationalism (qawmiyyah).

By associating patriotism with religion, the Islamic Jihad cut itself off from the Muslim Brotherhood, for whom the re-Islamization of society is top priority, independent from the struggle against occupation.[8] At the end of the 1970s, the Islamic activism that appeared on the Palestinian scene was linked to the Jordanian and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhoods. The movement sought to reorganize society according to Islamic standards through the mosques, the universities, and an impressive number of charitable organizations. During the decade preceding the uprising, the Muslim Brothers established an extensive social welfare network in the Gaza Strip (charitable societies, dispensaries, kindergartens, sporting clubs, quranic schools, zakat [Islamic tithes] committees, etc.), from which Shaikh Ahmad Yasin, a former schoolmaster, emerged as a charismatic and influential leader. His Islamic Assembly (al-Mujamma al-Islami), founded in 1973, infiltrated the majority of mosques and came to control the Islamic University of Gaza. Religious associations were founded by the Muslim Brothers in the West Bank also, but they failed to establish a real network or to find their own leader; thus, the mosques remained in most cases under the control of the Jordanian ministry of awqaf (Islamic endowments). Prior to the intifada, the Brotherhood avoided confrontations with the occupying power and confined its political activities to the struggle against Palestinian "infidels," mainly the Communist Party. Fatah and Jordan encouraged this Islamist attack on the "left." Israel also had an interest in encouraging any division among the Palestinians.[9]

The Brotherhood maintained these policies until the intifada, although many people were reluctant to join an organization that required them to choose between religion and anti-Israeli activism. Whereas it was almost spontaneous at the beginning, once set in motion the uprising quickly became organized through local and regional committees whose mobilization capacity was, in most cases, able to overcome organizational fragmentation. The mobilization of the entire Palestinian society forced the Muslim Brothers to join the active resistance to the occupation. In these new conditions they had to recognize that their survival as a religious mobilizing organization depended on rejecting their former passivity and acknowledging patriotism as a prerequisite of any activity. HAMAS was therefore created.

The new organization was founded in two stages. In mid-December 1987, some prominent Muslim Brothers in Gaza decided, on their own initiative, to form a mobilizing structure called Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah (The Movement of Islamic Resistance, or HAMAS). This initiative appears to have been the work of people like Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi, a physician working at the Islamic University of Gaza; and Salah Shahada and Yahya al-Sinuwwar, former student leaders at the Islamic University who were in charge of security matters in the Muslim Brotherhood. Although Shaikh Ahmad Yasin, the spiritual guide of the association in Gaza, apparently gave his approval, traditionalist hostility to any political

move not directly connected to religious mobilization drove him to maintain a clear distinction between this Islamic resistance and the Brotherhood. Two months later, however, in February 1988, the Brotherhood formally recognized The Movement of Islamic Resistance as its "strong arm." It is noteworthy that the acronym HAMAS dates from this very time.[10] It seems that this decision was made in Amman during a meeting between prominent Jordanian and Palestinian Muslim Brothers at the Islamic hospital. The Jordanian Brotherhood's spiritual guide, Shaikh Abd al-Rahman Khalifa, was present, as was the director of the hospital, Ali al-Hawamda, and parliament members Ziyad Abu Ghanima, Hamza Mansur, and Hamam Said. Palestinians, of course, were also present, among them the official spokesman of HAMAS, Ibrahim Ghawcha, and the representative of the movement in Jordan, Muhammad Nazzal; from Gaza, the unofficial spokesman in the Occupied Territories, Mahmud al-Zahhar, a surgeon, and Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi; and from the West Bank, probably Shaikh Jamil Hamami, a preacher from Jerusalem.[11]

Initiated by the operations of the Jihad and soon transformed into concepts by the followers of the PLO, the uprising owed its continuation to the presence of both nationalists and Islamists in the streets of Palestine. The Islamist militants were actively involved, despite their rejection of the ultimate political goal assigned to the intifada by the UNLU, i.e., the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Therefore, thanks to the wide and deeply rooted associative network put at the disposal of the intifada, political expertise, and a visibly growing military commitment, the Muslim Brotherhood, via HAMAS, managed as an organization to embody Islamic anti-Israeli resistance. This role grew because the PLO concentrated on the diplomatic process and left the conduct of the uprising and the armed mobilization since 1991 almost entirely to its shock troops, the Black Panthers of Fatah, the Fatah Hawks, the Red Eagles of the PFLP, and others, which were already distancing themselves from the political leadership. There is no doubt that this retreat gave opportunities to the armed wings of the Islamist movement—Kataib Sayf al-Islam and al-Quwah al-Islamiyyah al-Mujahidah (QASAM) of the Islamic Jihad, and Kataib Izz al-Din al-Qassam of HAMAS—to become more involved in the armed anti-Israeli resistance.[12]

Subsequently, the uprising began to change. Its daily struggle no longer followed the political and diplomatic lines of the project advocated outside the Occupied Territories. For the most part, actors in the West Bank and Gaza called for a reform of diplomatic initiatives (as demanded by the Democratic and Popular Fronts, or parts of Fatah and of the Palestinian People's Party, formerly communist), or even for their total termination (HAMAS, Islamic Jihad, and small organizations based in Damascus and not members of the PLO). New forms of violence concurrently emerged: first a "war of the knives" through an increased number of attacks against

civilians, and then genuine guerrilla operations. The struggle also spread with operations carried out not only in the Occupied Territories, but also deep inside Israel.

Thus, while HAMAS was condemning the recognition of Israel as spelled out by the Palestinian National Council in 1988, calling for the liberation of Palestine "from the river to the sea," and carrying out an increasing number of military operations, the PLO withdrew from the field of violent confrontation, having failed to obtain concrete results subsequent to its political concessions. As a result, HAMAS succeeded in imposing itself as the legitimate alternative to nationalism.[13]

Islamism as a Response to the Washington Agreement

When the Israeli-Palestinian agreement secretly negotiated in Oslo was ratified in Washington on 13 September 1993, many commentators believed it to portend a decrease in HAMAS's influence; they attributed it to increasing Palestinian frustration over the deadlock of the Madrid peace talks. In their opinion, by signing the agreement, Israel had restored the PLO's political hegemony. The signing was followed by a short-lived euphoria. Fifteen months later, the PLO, or more properly Fatah, was discredited by the situation resulting from the ratification in Cairo on 9 February 1994 of the agreement on security issues in Gaza and the Jericho area, and 4 May 1994 implementation of Palestinian self-rule in those areas. Six months after the return of Yasir Arafat to Gaza, an increasing number of Palestinians believed that their administration was no longer able to defend their most elementary rights.[14] Henceforth the Islamist movement was deeply rooted in the political scene, and HAMAS, combining patriotism and integrity in an all-inclusive Islamic rhetoric, claimed to be the legitimate heir of PLO nationalism.

The Israeli army left no doubt about the increasing importance of HAMAS, even before the massive wave of military operations against Kataib al-Qassam. On 26 December 1993, General Matzan Vilnay, chief of the southern military region, speaking to a group of Israeli members of the Knesset visiting Gaza, estimated the population's support for HAMAS at 40 percent. An intelligence officer, believing this to be an underestimate, proposed a rate closer to 50 percent as more realistic.[15] Various elections held by student groups and professional organizations support the higher estimate. On 24 November 1993 at the elections for the student council at Bir Zeit University (2,536 registered), the HAMAS and the Popular and Democratic Fronts bloc won 52 percent of the vote against Fatah, the People's Party, and Fida (formerly the Democratic Front, Abd Rabbuh movement).[16] At the Islamic University of Gaza, on 5 and 6 November 1994, HAMAS received 91.5 percent of the vote and Islamic Jihad 7.7 per-

cent; convinced of their defeat, the Fatah and PFLP blocs withdrew from the elections. Although an election tally at an Islamic university was not necessarily an accurate barometer of public opinion for the whole Strip, it is noteworthy that two weeks later, the Fatah bloc won the elections at al-Azhar University in Gaza (2,742 registered), their stronghold, with only 64 percent of the votes (1,764 votes), leaving 24 percent to HAMAS and 6 percent to the Islamic Jihad. Thus, in spite of Arafat's return to Gaza, Fatah failed to win new positions in Gaza's two most important universities.

Moreover, although elections had formerly been won exclusively in the academic arena, since the intifada, elections increasingly favored Islamist tickets, proving that support for Islamic groups has spread to almost all professional fields.[17] For example, on 28 January 1994, at the elections of the Gaza Engineers' Association (929 registered), the HAMAS and Jihad bloc won 46.7 percent of the votes, Fatah 43.95 percent, PFLP 6.5 percent, Arab Liberation Front (pro-Iraqi) 1.3 percent, and Fida 1.2 percent. In most of the professional and university elections held between 1989 and 1994, HAMAS and Fatah obtained almost the same results, i.e., around 40 percent each, reflecting the ability of each party to build alliances to ensure victory. By comparison, current opinion polls accord Fatah 40 to 43 percent of projected votes and HAMAS only 12 to 17 percent.[18] Experts emphasized that the differences in the results of professional elections can be explained by the prevalence among the total population of the traditionalists and/or older population who declare themselves either "independent" or support the existing power, whatever it may be. Fatah is still considered the existing power, but for how long?

The rising power of the Islamists is even more noticeable on the military front, where HAMAS and to a lesser—although not negligible—degree the Islamic Jihad gained a quasi-monopoly. Some of these operations, such as the killing in an ambush in December 1993 of the coordinator of the Israeli army's undercover units in the Gaza Strip, manifested undeniable military skill and expertise. By increasing the number of suicide operations, the Kataib al-Qassam of HAMAS (and QASAM of Islamic Jihad) brought a new type of warfare to Palestine. The fighters' resolve has rendered these operations, carried out mostly in Israel itself, very deadly and has raised a massive public reaction among both Israelis and Palestinians. As revenge for the Hebron massacre on 25 February 1994, when a Jewish settler killed thirty worshipers in the Patriarch mosque, the Kataib al-Qassam promised and carried out 5 anti-Israeli operations. The first occurred on 6 April, when 8 Israelis were killed and 19 wounded near the center of Afula (Galilee) in a suicide operation involving a bus. On 13 April, a bomb exploded in the central bus station of Hadera (Galilee), killing 6 Israelis and wounding 21 others. After a pause during the summer, al-Qassam began new operations on 9 October, when a commando raided a commercial street in Jerusalem, killing 2 passers-by and wounding 14 others. On 14 October, Corporal Waxman, who had earlier been abducted,

was killed when the Israeli army raided the house in which he was detained. The last operation of the series was the most deadly: a 19 October bombing of a bus in the center of Tel-Aviv killed 23 persons and injured nearly 50.

The increase of HAMAS's power should be viewed in connection with the conditions under which the negotiation of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement was conducted. In this post–Cold War period, the Washington agreement formalized the balance of power between Israel and the Palestinians or, more generally, between the international community and the Arab world. One of the cosignatories of the agreement, Israel, was reputedly regarded as the winner, the other, the loser. But, after having publicly chosen the Palestinians as "partners," Israel returned to a strong line and offered no signs of goodwill. Therefore, because of the lack of broad consensus on the recognition of Israel in the present context, the Jewish state reinforced the Palestinian fear of seeing its leadership become the front line defense of the occupation, i.e., a supplementary militia matching Antoine Lahad's Army of South Lebanon.[19] Thus, HAMAS succeeded in gathering together those who opposed the Oslo process on the grounds that it would create Palestinian Bantustans, and those who still favor the process but believe Arafat has conceded so much that the predictions of those who reject it have been justified. The daily humiliations inflicted on the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories and on the PLO only strengthened HAMAS and its Kataib Izz al-Din al-Qassam, and the Islamic Jihad with its al-Quwah al-Mujahidah al-Qasam, which became spearheads of the Palestinian resistance.

None of the dates mentioned in the Washington agreement were honored by Israel: its army redeployments in Gaza and Jericho were delayed for more than five months; the redeployment in the West Bank and the elections of a Palestinian council of autonomy, both scheduled for July 1994, were still being negotiated in Cairo at the beginning of 1995. There was no end to repression: between 13 September and 30 November 1994, 164 Palestinians were killed by the army, among them many who had been placed by the government on the killing list of the "special units."[20] Although several hundred prisoners were freed, some 6,000 of them remained in detention centers. Colonization continued: around 470 hectares of land were confiscated per month from the beginning of the uprising; after the Madrid conference, the rate fell to 250 hectares per month but rose to 840 hectares after Oslo.[21] In 1993, according to the Israeli Bureau of Statistics, the Jewish population in the settlements in the West Bank (Jerusalem excluded) and Gaza increased by 9.3 percent (i.e., 115,000 settlers according to official estimates and 136,415 according to the settlers themselves); in East Jerusalem, occupied in 1967, the Jewish population (168,000) is now larger than the Palestinian (155,000). In Jerusalem, M. Meir Davidson, a former leading member of Ateret Cohanim, the movement for the colonization of the Muslim quarter of the Old City, was

appointed to the town council at the beginning of 1994 as adviser for East Jerusalem affairs. Israel never abandoned its policy of collective punishment: the government repeatedly answered armed operations by sealing off the whole of the Occupied Territories, each time sending their precarious economy into free fall. Although the Hebron massacre was an individual act, it became for the Palestinians an official casus belli due to the massive repression by the Israeli army of the popular demonstrations that followed and the appropriation of a great part of the shrine to the benefit of the Jews.

Seen as a shelter for Palestinian dignity, HAMAS was viewed by large portions of the population as the voice of the Occupied Territories. This was a reaction to the political and diplomatic games that seemed to benefit the PLO leadership outside the Territories, but from which the Palestinians inside the Territories felt more and more excluded. At its beginning, the uprising had indeed been the appropriation by the population in the Territories of the political initiative. But by calling for negotiations as early as 1988, the underground UNLU gave this initiative back to the leadership in Tunis and to its official representatives inside the Territories, i.e., the pre-intifada establishment.[22] The Madrid and Washington negotiations maintained the illusion that the population inside the Territories was being heard, despite the fact that the real talks were taking place on a totally different basis, conducted secretly in Oslo between a handful of Yasir Arafat's personal representatives and the Israelis. Only a few days prior to the signing of the agreement did the population discover that its representatives in Washington were mere puppets. Later, when Arafat returned to Gaza with his old comrades, he was clearly reluctant to share power.

Therefore, for an increasing number of Palestinians—victims of daily difficulties under self-rule—Arafat, his team, and his police have been perceived as outsiders. HAMAS has taken advantage of this popular rejection of the PLO's operation under Arafat's guidance. More and more voices inside the organization have publicly denounced Yasir Arafat's disregard for institutional structures, since he rarely convenes them; when he does, it is only to ratify decisions he has already made. Growing public discontent was apparent, for instance, when Arafat called a meeting of the leadership in Tunis on 1 May 1994 to discuss the agreement he was about to sign in Cairo; both PLO executive committee members and leaders from the Occupied Territories boycotted the meeting. Since the assassinations of his companions in the struggle, founders of Fatah Abu Jihad (April 1988) and Abu Iyad (January 1991), Arafat has been acting on his own, surrounded by only a few advisers (Abu Mazin, Yasir Abd Rabbuh, Nabal Shaah, and Abu Ala). Internal criticism has undermined the cohesion of the structure but has not led Arafat to significantly change his modus operandi. For example, he has failed to act on the demand for democratic reforms presented in

April 1994 and later repeated by Haydar Abd al-Shafi, former head of the Palestinian delegation to the bilateral negotiations in Washington.

As a result, Yasir Arafat has seemed to be more and more isolated. Resentment reached even the most loyal among the leaders who were formerly outside the Territories, such as Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazin), the main negotiator during the Oslo process, who refused any official involvement after Arafat's return to Gaza. Most of Arafat's companions, both from the diaspora and from the Occupied Territories, were reluctant to support an agreement they believed would produce a powerless Palestinian authority, given Arafat's habits and the terms imposed by Israel.

In the Occupied Territories, the internal crisis in Fatah sprang from the extensive restructuring of the political stage after six years of intifada. With the uprising, a new underground leadership emerged, comprising young, educated residents and refugees coming from towns, camps, and villages. The nationalist establishment—resident, urban, and largely concentrated in the Jerusalem-Ramallah-Bethlehem area—had formerly built its legitimacy on its privileged relationship with the leadership from the outside, thus confining itself to the fringes. In charge of establishing a structure of self-government, Fatah has resumed its established practice, aiming at controlling society by subduing its representatives. But, by appointing notables of the traditional establishment, such as Zakarya al-Agha in Gaza, to key positions, Yasir Arafat, disregarding the potential risk of the disintegration of his movement, excluded many young leaders who voiced their disagreement. Six months after the return of its president, Arafat's movement was nearly split. The Fatah internal elections were postponed in December 1994 after the first elections held in Ramallah in November put new leaders in office. (There is speculation that the Fatah leadership was not confident enough in the results of the forthcoming election.) Meanwhile, several violent incidents of infighting occurred in the Occupied Territories. Israeli demands concerning the exercise of self-rule and Fatah's internal dissension and inability to build a true and credible nationalist opposition enabled HAMAS to prosper, taking advantage of its own vitality and political skill.

Challenges to HAMAS

In such a context, HAMAS has had to diversify its role from within. Because its main support was drawn from a combination of a core of militants committed to the fight for an Islamic Palestine and individuals close to the PLO and independent movements, it, of necessity, assigned a lesser order of priority to religious and social concerns, although these elements have remained an important connection to the Muslim Brotherhood. Indeed, thanks to its pietistic past, HAMAS has the support of some of the

most traditional elements of Palestinian society, which had previously been close to Jordan. However, granting autonomy to its "powerful arm" and allowing recruitment beyond the ranks of its traditional constituency created the risk for the Muslim Brotherhood of being challenged on its own ground. The growing challenge for HAMAS has undoubtedly been in the management of its internal diversity, on which the old guard and the younger generation have disagreed. The former, nostalgic for the internal coherence of the Muslim Brotherhood, regards diversity as a danger to the integrity of Islam and to the association, while the latter is more grassroots in its approach, promoting diversity as a source of enrichment. This became a dangerous challenge to the movement, which, at least in the beginning, was not able to assume the heritage of Fatah and the PLO without exacerbating its internal and long-standing contradictions.

Therefore, the behavior of HAMAS leaders should be viewed in terms of contradictions that have been part of the long history of the movement, rather than in terms of "finely calibrated political and military policy."[23] Historically, most HAMAS leaders stem from the Muslim Brotherhood, clinging to the centrality of religion. In their eyes, HAMAS's first priority is neither to seize administration of Palestinian policy from the PLO, nor to achieve the immediate liberation of Palestine. Shaikh Yasin's whole strategy can be viewed as pragmatism tied to the interests of the movement's religious imperatives (dawa). The spiritual guide of HAMAS considers patriotic struggle to be a simple means of reinforcing the legitimacy of his re-Islamization movement. Therefore, caution must be exercised in order to maintain its patriotic image, while avoiding any kind of repression that would imperil the Brotherhood's infrastructure.

Yet large parts of HAMAS's constituency no longer share this wait-and-see policy. Indeed, many younger members who joined HAMAS directly without being affiliated with the Brotherhood never adhered to this principle. The same contradiction can be observed between the leaders inside the Occupied Territories and their counterparts abroad. Most of HAMAS's representatives outside the Territories, such as Muhammad Nazzal in Amman, have different agendas, focusing instead on substituting their movement for the PLO, most often through a policy of radical refusal. Because they deal exclusively with states and organizations rather than interacting with the populace,[24] they have no need to organize religious activities.

For instance, during the Gulf War the leadership of HAMAS outside the Territories adopted the stance of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, which aligned itself with Iraq and publicly distanced itself from its internal counterpart. After having shown some "understanding" vis-à-vis the Kuwaitis under occupation and having called for a vote on self-determination, HAMAS inside the Territories chose to remain silent on the crisis rather than aligning itself with public opinion and that of its Jordanian neighbors. The war itself enabled leaders both inside and outside the

Territories to speak in the name of the people, denouncing "the new Crusaders' aggression." Thus pragmatic leaders gave priority to preserving HAMAS's infrastructure. In this case, its opinion prevailed over the opinion of its radical challenger. This cleverness was later to be amply rewarded by the Gulf states, which maintained their financial support to the Islamist movement, while boycotting the PLO politically and financially.[25]

The Kataib Izz al-Din al-Qassam, for their part, have never agreed on these lukewarm historical and political activities. Because of the secrecy surrounding them, the detailed conditions of their birth and their operating mode are still unknown.[26] HAMAS's political leadership appears to have more symbolic than concrete authority over them. More than ever, they have pushed the uncompromising struggle against Israel, putting the Palestinian Authority (PNA) in an uncomfortable position at a time when many of HAMAS's political leaders want to transform their movement into an official political party. This kind of contradiction is not new. It dates back to the kidnapping and assassination of two Israeli soldiers, Sasportas and Saadon, in spring 1989. This twofold operation, claimed by the Kataib al-Qassam, was the first military action that clearly contradicted the primarily religious policy advocated by Shaikh Yasin. One of its first results was to shake the whole structure of the movement, following the massive Israeli raid against its supporters and the arrest of the shaikh himself, who was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Kataib conducted a similar military operation in December 1992 when it kidnapped Toledano, an Israeli border policeman. He was assassinated a few hours after Shaikh Yasin called on the abductors to keep him alive as an asset for negotiation. The operation led to the deportation of more than 400 so-called Islamists to Marj al-Zuhur in south Lebanon, which served to further destabilize the movement.

Kataib al-Qassam's increasingly dreadful operations deep inside Israel and against settlers at the fringes of Gaza gave Israel the opportunity to transform the political wing of HAMAS into its foremost enemy. Therefore, according to the Israeli view of the agreement, to achieve peace, HAMAS had to become the PNA's first target for eradication. Despite the fact that the HAMAS information office has always assumed its military operations to be on behalf of the Kataib al-Qassam, some of the political leaders inside, and even outside, the Occupied Territories kept a certain distance but did not condemn them. The most striking statement was made by Musa Abu Marzuq, head of HAMAS's political department, who lives in Amman, on the day of the Waxman abduction.[27] He announced his organization's agreement to a cease-fire with Israel in exchange for Israel's withdrawal from Gaza and the West Bank (including Jerusalem), the dismantling of the settlements, Israeli recognition of the right of return for the refugees, and the organization of free elections. Many younger supporters viewed Abu Marzuq's offer as an ideological deviation and demanded a

quick "clarification," despite Shaikh Yasin's and Muhammad Nazzal's similar former declarations. The controversy died down when Abu Marzuq himself declared his statement had been misinterpreted. Some weeks later, on 2 June 1994, Gazan Islamist Shaikh Ahmad Bahar declared that resistance to occupation "does not have to be by armed struggle; it can be by words, opinions, and unifying people."[28] In October 1994, another HAMAS leader from Nablus, Shaikh Jamal Salim, speaking on Radio Israel in Arabic, suggested a mutual cessation of attacks against civilians.[29]

The same differences in the political behavior of HAMAS's leaders can be observed concerning the institutional relationship between HAMAS and the Jewish state. On 13 December 1993, for instance, General Doron Almog, commander of the Israeli army in the Gaza Strip, asserted upon taking office the previous week that he had met with "eminent HAMAS leaders" during the previous week. HAMAS denied this statement the next day in a leaflet issued in Gaza, stating that no meeting with an Israeli official was ever considered. A few weeks later, Mahmud al-Zahhar, former head of the information committee in Marj al-Zuhur, declared: "We have been told that army officers have met with HAMAS leaders before the deportation [in Marj al-Zuhur]; really, I have no objection to such meetings."[30] This declaration was made at the same time that the Kataib al-Qassam were increasing their anti-Israeli operations.

HAMAS's participation in the elections for the PNA was also a source of contradictory statements. Shaikh Hamid al-Bitawi, qadi of Tulkarm (northern West Bank), preacher in al-Aqsa mosque, president of the League of the Ulamas of Palestine, and former deportee to Marj al-Zuhur, was representative of the most open-minded trend, asserting unconditionally that "the Islamic movement will take part in the elections."[31] On the other hand, Shaikh Yasin, sending a series of letters from prison,[32] again displayed his traditional pragmatism, writing that "holding elections is now an issue for the Palestinians; the Islamists are divided between those supporting participation and those opposing it; as far as I am concerned, but only God knows, I consider it is better to participate than to abstain, providing that the Council be empowered with legislative privileges (tashri); as a matter of fact, we are opposed to what is happening in the streets, so why not express our opposition within the legislative institution which will de jure become in the future the authority representing the Palestinian people?" Such participation "will reassert the strength of the Islamic presence on the arena and will prevent it from losing ground because of its isolation." Ibrahim Ghawsha, spokesman for HAMAS in Amman and a negotiator representing the movement in the framework of the ten organizations opposed to the Washington agreement,[33] was compelled to take a harder stand when he claimed on 6 January 1994 in Damascus that Shaikh Yasin's words had been distorted and that HAMAS would not participate in prospective elections regarding autonomy. "Nevertheless," he added, "HAMAS will contin-

ue to participate in non-political elections." His stand on this matter was identical to that of Mahmud al-Zahhar, who stated that "we will participate in any election not connected with autonomy."[34]

Six months after Arafat returned to Gaza, HAMAS's behavior toward the PNA was essentially conciliatory, however rejectionist its public discourse. Despite occasional fighting and although the police killed 13 people and injured almost 200 others in Gaza on 18 November 1994, during a demonstration convoked by HAMAS, discipline prevented civil war. Every important conflict that occurred between the nationalists and the Islamists was followed by negotiations and agreement. It is to be noted that HAMAS never attacked Palestinian political figures, despite HAMAS's rejection of the Oslo agreement. To avoid problems for and with the PNA, HAMAS also refrained from attacking Israelis in Gaza. This attitude reflects an extreme realism vis-à-vis the autonomy. HAMAS accepted the Oslo agreement as a fact and is now forging the movement's new politics. Such pragmatism lends strength to the desire of some HAMAS leaders to transform the movement into an opposition party.

From 1984 to 1994 the Palestinian political scene was characterized by increasing polarization between nationalist and Islamist organizations. The Islamic Jihad, as a precursor, succeeded in reconciling Islam and patriotism, but failed as the organizational axis for this reconciliation and gave up this role to HAMAS during the uprising. The tremendous impact of the intifada on every aspect of the Palestinian situation was evident. Following the uprising, the Palestinian organizational, political, and military balances underwent a general restructuring: between the "inside" and the "outside"; between the youth of the UNLU and the established old guard; and between patriotism, nationalism, and religion. The Islamist movements clearly showed a greater ability than the nationalist organizations to profit from these new realities. Nevertheless, although the reconciliation of Islam with patriotism occurred on the level of ideology, the Islamist/nationalist dichotomy remained on the level of organization.

Furthermore, because there was no consensus, the signing of the Washington agreement increased the tensions within each movement, as well as between the main blocs. Six months after Arafat's return to Gaza, Fatah appeared doomed to split between the supporters of its president, to whom Israel and the international community have left no choice but to form the Palestinian equivalent of the Army of South Lebanon, in charge of policing and administrating Bantustan-like enclaves; and a bewildered grassroots constituency, who has decided to go back to the old principle of rejection, since occupation continues with no acceptable solution in sight. The Washington agreement could also lead HAMAS to split between its traditional advocacy of political participation in the higher interest of its religious activities and radical rejection of autonomy and support for an all-out armed struggle.

Therefore, the ground of the Palestinian political debate focused less on the conflict between nationalism and Islamism, and highlighted instead the controversy between the supporters of self-rule as it now exists and the partisans of radical change. This new fault line was evident in a mid-November 1994 public opinion poll conducted by the CPRS, which found 49.8 percent of the population in the Occupied Territories "accepting the PLO solution as the solution for the Palestinian cause" (i.e., establishment of two separate states in Palestine), and 38.7 percent "accepting the Islamic solution (that which is suggested by the Islamic movements and calling for the liberation of Palestine from the sea to the river)." When asked how they would vote if elections were held at that time, 42.3 percent said they would vote for Fatah's candidates, 17.4 percent for HAMAS's, and 3.7 percent for Jihad's. While 56.6 percent of the people supported armed operations against Israel, only 34.4 percent condemned them. Such figures indicate that HAMAS, as an organization, has not yet registered all its supporters. Considering the increasing rejection of the present terms of the self-rule, HAMAS will have to reconcile Islamism and nationalism if it wants either to replace the PLO or to become its new axis. Palestinian popular opinion seems to leave the door wide open for this task.

Conclusion

By August 1996, the pessimistic tone of the preceding discussion was corroborated by the manner in which the various agreements were implemented and by the measures taken by the new Israeli government. Official mutual recognition would not only have allowed Palestinians to recognize Israel's right to exist within Palestine (as Yasir Arafat, in his capacity as "representative of the Palestinians" did in the name of the PLO in September 1993), but also would have compelled Israel to recognize the national rights of the Palestinians within Palestine. By avoiding this official recognition, Israel still appeared to cling to the exclusivist ideals of Zionism, suggesting that the recent agreements constitute a means of continuing the occupation rather than ending it. Israel has indeed established its control over the Palestinians, no longer from within the populated zones through the presence of the Israeli army, but now from the outside, through the Palestinians themselves. Israel succeeded in this goal ten years after the failed endeavors of the Jordanians and the leagues of villages so precious to Ariel Sharon in the early 1980s. Confining the Palestinians in enclaves and intensified Jewish colonization of the Occupied Territories have replaced the expulsion of the Palestinians, which has become inconceivable in the present context.

For thirty years the Palestinians, under the PLO's leadership, built their national identity on recovering sovereignty over a shared land. By fos-

tering the "Bantustanization" of the Palestinians, the Washington agreement sanctioned the ideological, political, and military failure of the PLO while at the same time imposing it as the authority. Historically, the PLO regarded the recovery of the territory as top priority and the basis of Palestinian unity. Therefore the disappointment generated by the agreement shook the credibility of the PLO, leaving the field wide open for the Islamists to gain exclusive control as the sole potentially legitimate heirs, due to their successful fusion of nationalism and Islamization. Now facing the impossibility of recovering the territory and the threat of social disintegration, the religious ideology could prove to be the most efficient recourse, transforming Palestine from the symbol of Palestinian national identity to its place of fulfillment. Deriving its strength from its widespread associative, charitable, and cultural network, the Islamist movement may therefore be seen as the "natural" solution to social collapse.

Two years after Arafat's return to Gaza, as the limitations of the peace process have become clearer, the PNA, replacing right with might, capitalized on the exhaustion of the population and the threat of a civil war. It denied its challengers access to the political scene and the right to carry out military operations. As HAMAS and Jihad experienced severe joint Palestinian and Israeli repression, Arafat capitalized on the more conservative trends in society, bolstered by the January 1996 election of the Self-Rule Council, which was boycotted by both the Islamist and nationalist opposition, who regularly have strong showings in other elections. Despite its claim to be the legitimate successor of both the PLO and nationalism in political and military affairs, Islamism in this new context is prone to its former fundamentalist practices, aimed exclusively at religious and social goals. Therefore, it risks breaking along its old internal fault lines.

On ideological grounds, the return to religion, more than the recently adopted armed struggle, appears in HAMAS's literature as the preferred expression of jihad, as suggested by the slogan "Islam is the solution and the option." HAMAS is able to negotiate the recovery of Palestine in conjunction with the reconstruction of a unified society because this task is built into its own political and military structures. The normative discourse on the basic illegitimacy of Israel's existence and its inevitable destruction can be converted into various—even contradictory—daily practices, including a more or less temporary coexistence with the Israeli state.

Since about 1995, HAMAS has even demonstrated an ability to defer armed struggle, juxtaposing the heightened military activities of the Kataib al-Qassam with the declarations of Musa Abu Marzuq. Despite Israeli concessions to its demands, HAMAS's political command in the autonomous Occupied Territories has, since June 1995, kept its military wing and some of its representatives abroad at a distance, since it refused to assume responsibility for the three suicide attacks that occurred that summer. From August 1995 until January 1996 a truce was observed as negotiations were

carried out between HAMAS, the PNA, and some Israeli authorities. The truce was broken on 5 January 1996, when Yahya Ayyache, the mastermind behind the most dreadful attacks of recent years, was assassinated. A small group from the region of Hebron—still under Israeli military occupation—decided, therefore, to split from both its political and military commands. Responsibility for the February 1996 attacks launched by the "cells of the martyr engineer Yahya Ayyache" in Askelon and Jerusalem was claimed by neither HAMAS nor the Kataib al-Qassam.

If permanent warfare with Israel can be considered by many Islamists, relationships with the PNA could also reach a state of normalcy where violence could be banned. Due to the Islamic interdiction against fitna (war between Muslims—Palestinian versus Palestinian in a civil war), and in spite of the repression it has endured, the Islamist movement has never begun a general, open struggle against Arafat's structures; quite the opposite: concerning matters within the jurisdiction of the PNA but without any link to the Israeli frame of self-rule, the Islamist movement did not hesitate to get involved in managing Palestinian affairs. For example, in January 1995, it accepted the appointment of one of its members, Shaikh Hamid al-Baytawi, as president of the official and recently created Islamic court of appeals.

This neofundamentalism to which Islamism was compelled to return after the "revolutionary option" reached a dead end exists outside the convulsive movements of some marginal cells. Its influence on society will therefore become clearer as the population derives new strategies against adversity from religion, having no recourse to any possibility of national liberation or real democracy. Because no Israeli concession on the question of Palestine is expected anytime in the near future, popular perceptions of the PNA's illegitimacy are bound to intensify in these "Bantustans of Allah" created by Israel with quasi-unanimous international assent.

Notes

1. Jean-François Legrain, *Les Voix du Soulevèment Palestinien 1987–1988* [The Voices of the Palestinian Uprising 1987–1988] (Cairo: Centre d'Etudes et de Documentation Economique, Juridique et Sociale [CEDEJ], 1991); Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising, Israel's Third Front* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990).

2. Jean-François Legrain, "The Islamic Movement and the Intifada," in *Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads*, ed. Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock (New York: Praeger, 1990), 175–189.

3. Izz al-Din al-Faris and Ahmad Sadiq, "al-Qadiyya al-Filastiniyya Hiyya al-Qadiyya al-Markaziyya lil-Haraka al-Islamiyya" [The Palestinian Cause Is Central to the Islamic Movement], *al-Mukhtar al-Islami* 13 (June 1980): 28–41. For a history of the movement, see Movement of the Islamic Jihad, *Masirat al-Jihad al-Islami fi Filastin* [The Development of Islamic Jihad in Palestine] (Beirut: [n.p.], 1989); and Eli Rekhess, "The Iranian Impact on the Islamic Jihad Movement in the

Gaza Strip," in *The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World*, ed. David Menashri (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).

4. Asad al-Tamimi, *Zawal Israil, Hatmiyya Quraniyya* [The Destruction of Israel, Quranic Ineluctability] (al-Qahirah: al-Mukhtar al-Islami, 198-).

5. Muhsin Thabit, *Nashat al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya fi Sujun al-Ihtilal al-Israili* [Emergence of al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya in the Israeli Occupation's Jails] (n.p., n.p., n.d.).

6. The jihad historiography considers that the intifada began after its October operation; the PLO and HAMAS consider that it began only two months later, in spite of recurrent popular insurrections throughout the fall. The Islamic Jihad replies that, in any case, it started with the call for a general strike that immediately followed the December accident, a strike known as the first act of global mobilization in the uprising.

7. The "spiritual guide" of this movement, Shaikh Abd al-Aziz Uda, a former lecturer at the Islamic University of Gaza, is said now to mistrust Shiqaqi, who wants to create a new organization. (Ramadan Shallah, a former lecturer at the University of South Florida in Tampa and one of the founders of the movement, was elected the new head of IJM after the assassination of Shiqaqi in Malta in October 1995.)

8. Mohammed K. Shahid, "The Muslim Brotherhood Movement in the West Bank and Gaza," *Third World Quarterly* 10:2 (April 1988): 658–682.

9. Schiff and Yaari, 223–225.

10. Communiqué No. 4, 11 February 1988, Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya. *HAMAS* means zeal, enthusiasm; the term is not found in the Quran.

11. According to a personal anonymous source in Amman, September 1994. The traditional historiography of HAMAS as found in Ahmad Rashad, *HAMAS: Palestinian Politics with Islamic Hue* (Annandale, Va.: United Association for Studies and Research, 1993). Ziad Abu Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994) never mentions this second meeting. This new information confirms my reading of the leaflets as found in *Les Voix du Soulèvement.*

12. It is essential to distinguish between *Qasam,* the acronym used by the jihad forces, which means oath, and *Qassam,* used by HAMAS to refer to the Syrian shaikh killed in 1935 by the British forces near Jenin; Qassam led a wide armed movement against the British and Jewish presence in Palestine.

13. Jean-François Legrain, "Palestinian Islamisms: Patriotism as a Condition of Their Expansion," in *Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements,* ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: American Academy of Sciences, 1994).

14. See, for example, Edward Said, *Peace and Its Discontents: Gaza-Jericho 1993–1995* (London: Vintage, 1995); Naseer Aruri, "From Oslo to Cairo: Repacking the Occupation," *Middle East International,* 13 May 1994, 16–17.

15. Steve Rodan, "Peace Upsets Generals' United Front," *Jerusalem Post,* 11 February 1994.

16. In December 1994, due to this new *rapport de forces,* the university decided to end the former first-past-the-post system, which had guaranteed exclusive Fatah control of the council since its creation, and to institute proportional representation.

17. Jean-François Legrain, "Les Elections Etudiants en Cisjordanie (1978–1987)," in *Démocratie et Démocratisations dans le Monde Arabe,* ed. J. C. Vatin et al. (Cairo: CEDEJ, 1992); Mahmud al-Zahhar, "al-Haraka al-Islamiyya: Haqaiq wa Arqam, Bayna al-Haqiqa wa-al-Wahm" [The Islamic Movement: Realities and Figures, Between Truth and Fiction], *al-Quds,* 10 November 1992 (reprinted in *Filastin al-Muslima,* December 1992).

18. The Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS) in Nablus publishes a monthly public opinion poll.

19. This fear is shared by Israel Shahak, "HAMAS and Arafat: The Balance of Power," *Middle East International* 468 (4 February 1994): 17–18. Edward Said, in *al-Ahram Weekly*, 7–13 October 1993, considers the Washington agreement as "an Instrument of Palestinian Surrender, a Palestinian Versailles." See also Jean-François Legrain, "De la Faiblesse de l'OLP, de la Sincérité d'Israel," *Le Monde*, 10 September 1993; Jean-François Legrain, "Gaza-Jericho, un Accord Contre la Paix," *Libération*, 7 March 1994; Jean-François Legrain, "Bantoustans Palestiniens et Terrorisme," *Liberation*, 26 October 1994.

20. Middle East Watch, *A License to Kill: Israeli Undercover Operations Against "Wanted" and Masked Palestinians* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993). During the same period, seventy Israelis were killed, proof of the increase of violence in the Territories.

21. Markaz Abhath al-Aradi, *al-Nashatat al-Istitaniyya wa-Musadarat al-Aradi fi-al-Diffa al-Gharbiyya* [The Settlement and Land Seizure Activities in the West Bank] (Jerusalem: Jamiyyat al-Dirasat al-Arabiyya, 24 January 1994).

22. Jean-François Legrain, "Le Leadership Palestinien de l'Intérieur" ("Document Husayni," Eté 1988), in *Etudes Politiques du Monde Arabe* (Cairo: CEDEJ, 1991).

23. This is the opinion of Graham Usher, "HAMAS Seeks a Place at the Table," *Middle East International*, 13 May 1994, 17–19, who also gives an excellent analysis of the recent situation.

24. HAMAS always claimed its lack of commitment in Jordanian affairs: the Islamist Palestinian mobilization in Jordan is officially left to the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood.

25. Jean-François Legrain, "A Defining Moment: Palestinian Islamic Fundamentalism," in *Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis*, ed. James Piscatori (Chicago: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991).

26. Anonymous, "al-Majd li-al-Qassam" [Glory to Qassam], *al-Sabil* (Organ of the Islamic Action Front in Amman), 5–30 January 1993, lists twenty-six military operations led by them; the first one indexed took place in April 1988. The information office of HAMAS, in a document published in *Filastin al-Muslima*, January 1994, lists ninety operations with the same first listing. *Filastin al-Muslima*, November 1994, published a list made by al-Qassam of all its "martyrs"; the first one died in December 1990.

27. The interview was published by *al-Sabil*, Amman, 19–25 April 1994.

28. Quoted in *Middle East International*, 10 June 1994.

29. Quoted in *Jerusalem Post*, 24 October 1994.

30. *al-Nahar*, 10 January 1994.

31. *al-Nahar*, 2 January 1994.

32. *al-Nahar*, 1 November 1993.

33. Forming an opposition coalition since the Madrid conference in September 1991, ten organizations (four members of the PLO—Popular Front of George Habash, Democratic Front of Nayif Hawateh, Popular Struggle Front of Khalid Abd al-Majid, and the Liberation Front; the four members of the pro-Syrian National Salvation Front—Fath-Intifada of Abu Musa, Popular Front–General Commander of Ahmad Jibril, Saiqa of Isam al-Qadi, and the Revolutionary Communist Party of Urabi Awad; and HAMAS and the Movement of Islamic Jihad in Palestine of Fathi Shiqaqi) designated a central leadership composed of twenty members, on 5 January 1994 in Damascus, and a secretariat composed of ten members.

34. *al-Nahar*, 10 January 1994.

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