ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE GULF CRISIS

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A Defining Moment: Palestinian Islamic Fundamentalism

Jean-François Legrain

The Gulf war precipitated a crisis, or moment of decision, for Hamas, the Islamic resistance movement of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Often termed a "fundamentalist" movement because of its "zeal" in pursuing an Islamic sociopolitical agenda built in part upon a principled refusal to negotiate with the Israelis and a dedication to the elimination of the Zionist state altogether, Hamas and its confrontational stance was enjoying a new-found political credibility among Palestinians in 1990 even as the Gulf crisis unfolded. The militant attitude taken toward Israelis had lifted Hamas to an unprecedented level of popularity as efforts of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to achieve a negotiated settlement through diplomatic channels entered its third frustrating year and as violence escalated on the West Bank and Gaza.

But the radical, uncompromising fundamentalism for which Hamas was known and increasingly admired would be put to the test as the movement quickly found itself in an ideological dilemma: should it follow the emotional lead of the Palestinian populace in support of Saddam Hussein, their self-styled liberator and fearless enemy of the Zionist state, or should the movement look to its future and to its immediate financial and organizational needs by distancing itself from the oppressor of its benefactor Kuwait?

The fact that the PLO, its rival for hegemony in the Palestinian resistance movement, chose the former course, was one important element in the calculations of the Islamic movement's leadership. Any crisis involves both opportunity and danger. By quietly choosing to restrain its natural enthusiasm for any anti-Western agent, and by anticipating that the Iraqi "liberator of Palestine" would fail, Hamas appears to have turned the crisis into an opportunity for expansion and to have proved itself, in this instance at least, to be more adept at reading the signs of the times than its nationalist rival. The long-term outcome is yet to be seen, but in the short-term Hamas may well have reaped financial and political benefits for its deft reactions to the crisis.

The Emergence of the Palestinian Islamic Movement

During the first ten years of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (1967–76), Islam rarely constituted the primary justification for the liberation struggle of the Palestinians.[1] This, rather, was maintained in the name of Arab or Palestinian nationalism. The "official" Islam of the West Bank was an integral part of Jordanian authority; in Gaza, it existed under the auspices of the Israeli military administration. In both cases the Islamic leadership was content to preside solely over religious matters.

At the end of the 1970s, however, a new type of Islamic activism appeared. Claiming the authority of the Muslim Brotherhood tradition and linked with its Egyptian and Jordanian branches, though financially supported by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, this movement had as its primary preoccupation the re-Islamization of society. This quest for re-Islamization was characterized by vigorous preaching in the mosques, but also by attacks on unveiled women and the destruction of bars and cinemas. Anti-Israeli radicalism was

the theme of its discourse: the liberation of Palestine is fundamentally a religious question which concerns the entire Islamic community; the protection of Islam in the face of repeated attacks by the West is, in fact, the main challenge of this century; since Israel constitutes the spearhead of this aggression, the Western menace can only be eliminated through the destruction of the "Jewish entity."

For the next decade—the ten years preceding the *intifada*—the Muslim Brotherhood refrained from confronting the occupying power and confined its political activity to the struggle against the Palestinian Communist Party. Fatah, the main wing of the PLO, and Jordan were happy to encourage this Islamist attack on the "left," and Israel too had an interest in encouraging any divisions among the Palestinians. Although this decision not to engage in direct resistance to the Israelis cost them political legitimacy among many Palestinians, the Brothers did manage to establish a large social welfare network in the Gaza Strip. There Shaikh Ahmad Yasin emerged as a charismatic and influential leader. His Islamic Assembly (al-Mutjamma' al-Islami) infiltrated the majority of mosques and came to control the Islamic University among both administrators and students (regularly winning 65 to 75 percent of the vote). But on the West Bank, in spite of the spread of religious associations, the Brothers failed to establish a network or to find themselves a viable leader. The majority of mosques escaped their control, and their only strongholds were in the universities where they obtained roughly 40 percent of the votes in student elections.[2]

It was only with the appearance of a second movement, rivaling the Muslim Brotherhood in the field of Islamic activism but fundamentally different in political behavior, that Islam became integral to the politics of the occupied territories. In the process, the Muslim Brotherhood itself was radically transformed. This second Islamist movement appeared publicly in 1983 and made *jihad* against Israel in all its forms, including armed struggle, the central religious

duty. The generic name of "Islamic Jihad" was applied to the various groups embracing this principle, each with a different structure and "guide" at the helm. Principal among the leaders were Fathi Shqaqi, a pharmacist from Rafah, who was particularly concerned with the military side of things, and Abd al-Aziz Uda, a lecturer at the Islamic University and spiritual leader of the movement.

The small groups that make up this movement are united by a common ideology influenced by the thought of the Muslim Brother intellectual, Sayyid Qutb (executed by the Egyptian regime in 1966); by the assassins of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat; and, although these groups are Sunni Muslim and resolutely Palestinian, by the Islamic revolution in Iran. As a general rule, activists come either from the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood, whose political conduct they criticized; or from the religious wing of Fatah. The Israeli army attributes the formation of the Brigades of Islamic Jihad (Saraya al-Jihad al-Islami) to this wing of Fatah, and, in 1986–87, through a series of anti-Israeli guerrilla operations,[3] they played an important role in inciting the intifada.

Almost spontaneous at the beginning, the uprising very quickly became organized through local and regional committees. In the case of PLO partisans, these committees reported to the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU, al-Qiyada al-Wataniyya al-Muwahhida li'l-Intifada); and, in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, they reported to the Movement of Islamic Resistance or, as commonly known in the Arabic acronym, Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya). The small groups that made up Jihad remained outside of these command structures.[4]

Established at the beginning of January 1988, the UNLU immediately took charge of decisions concerning the appropriateness and timing of general strikes, demonstrations, and other forms of civil disobedience. This was done by the regular publication of numbered communiqués. Its political program reaffirmed the principle that the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian people and demanded the

holding of an international conference under United Nations auspices for the creation of an independent state.

Among the non-PLO groups, Jihad became the victim of Israeli repression.[5] Virtually destroyed two or three months after the start of the uprising, it reemerged only at the end of 1988 in the form of periodic communiqués, a symbolic monthly strike, and the organization of a number of commando operations launched mainly from outside of the West Bank and Gaza. While the Jihad group of Shqaqi and Uda has been reestablished in south Lebanon,[6] another group has developed in Amman and is influenced by the person and ideas of Shaikh As'ad Bayyud al-Tamimi.[7] Yet another faction, developing in the summer of 1990, has coalesced around Ibrahim Sarbil in Amman. With its top command thus outlawed and in exile, "Islamic Jihad" has not been able to reconstitute an effective organization in the occupied territories.

By way of contrast, Hamas has operated within the occupied territories from the early days of the uprising. Led by Shaikh Ahmad Yasin and Dr. Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi,[8] a teacher at the Islamic University of Gaza, Hamas initially attracted Muslim Brothers on an individual basis only. In February 1988, however, the Brotherhood formally adopted Hamas as its militant arm.

In making the liberation of Palestine in its entirety—"from the (Jordan) river to the sea"—its new priority, the Brotherhood was brought into line with Jihad (without, however, the merger of their organizations). By taking part publicly in the struggle against Israel, the Brotherhood could now hope to gain the political legitimacy for which it had waited so long but which had been denied it because of its political quietism. Although at first willing to submit to the timetable of the nationalist and largely secular UNLU, tension set in. In light of Hamas' enhanced position and the PLO's relatively weakened one on the political chessboard, there was soon mutual consultation, but little substantial agreement, between the two main groups.

The Gulf Crisis and the Dilemma of Hamas

The position that Hamas took on the Gulf crisis must be seen in the context of its competition with the PLO for political ascendancy in the occupied territories. One could characterize Hamas' position as one of embarrassment: its leadership was caught between public opinion favorable to Saddam Hussein, on the one hand, and its financial dependence on the Gulf states, on the other.

There were many indications of this tension. Several *imams* were expelled from their mosques by Palestinian mobs for preaching against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, while the command of Hamas took two weeks to publish its position on the question. Communiqué 61, although dated 3 August 1990, ignored the invasion of Kuwait the day before. During the first two weeks of the crisis, Hamas did nothing more than reproduce two Jordanian communiqués—the declaration of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood of 5 August and the speech by one of its deputy leaders, Sulaiman Mansur, on 8 August. Only after 13 August did Hamas publish its own pronouncements, and only three of these treated the Gulf question in detail.[9] Moreover, between 3 August 1990 and 9 January 1991 (Communiqués 61 to 68), Hamas called for 19 days of general strike, but only two of these were devoted to condemnation of events in the Gulf. It advocated 37 particular demonstrations, yet not one had the Gulf War as its theme. As Palestinians increasingly demonstrated their support for Saddam on the streets, the leaders of Hamas returned the theme of mobilization against Israel to pride of place in their communiqués.[10] They also called for unity with the PLO.

Hamas adopted basically the same framework of analysis in responding to the Gulf crisis that it employs in addressing the Israeli-Palestinian question: this is another episode in the fight between good and evil, a new "crusade" by the West, "a hateful Christian plot against our religion,

our civilization and our land" which aims to put an end to the blessed movement of Islamic expansion.[11] The United States "commands all the forces hostile to Islam and the Muslims," and George Bush is "the chief of the false gods," "the leader of the forces of evil."[12] Although present in a minor way, anti-imperialist themes were not ignored: in communiqué 64, for example, Hamas charges that "America has exploited the entry of Iraqi forces into Kuwait and has used it [as an excuse] to occupy the region directly, whereas before it had occupied [the region] and had controlled its riches through the intermediary of its collaborators in the region."

This ontological-theological framework of analysis allows for little mention of the participation of Arab and Muslim troops in the anti-Iraqi coalition. Insofar as it is mentioned at all, Arab governments are depicted as having imposed on their people a decision which is contrary to religion, but which is regrettably consistent with their policy of undermining Islam "as a total way of life." The consequence can only be "decadence, back-sliding, and the breaking up of the *umma* [Islamic community]."[13]

Hamas also rejected the coalition's argument that it was defending international law: "Where were these states on the day when the Jews absorbed the land of Palestine, Sinai, and the Golan Heights, on the day when they invaded southern Lebanon?"[14] Moreover, the Security Council constitutes "world dictatorship in its most hideous form."[15] There the right of veto is exercised by Great Britain, which, through the Balfour Declaration, had "planted this cancerous body [Israel] on our land," and by America, "strategic ally of the sons of vipers."[16] The American forces "have exchanged their old colonial clothes to put on a new costume of support for international will in defense of right, justice, and legitimacy, but we are under no illusion: it is in fact a matter of preparing for the invasion of Iraq's territory and of facilitating the invasion of Jordan by Israel."[17]

Hamas endorsed the twin core principles that it is necessary "to resolve Arab differences within the Arab family," and

that it is equally necessary to refrain from using force, which can only lead to "the shedding of blood. . . between sons of the same umma and the opening of the door to hostile forces and states." [18] Once stipulated, however, these principles were eclipsed by an almost exclusive preoccupation with the question of a foreign presence in the region. Indeed, the Hamas command steered between total obfuscation of the Iraqi invasion itself and detailed reference to the plight of Kuwait.

In the declaration of 5 August, the Muslim Brotherhood made reference to "the entry *(dukhul)* of Iraqi forces into Kuwait." The expression, used again later, can appear lenient,[19] but Iraq's entry is nonetheless condemned in the name of the principle that Arabs should not spill Arab blood. Yet this unfavorable mention disappeared entirely from the declaration of Sulaiman Mansur of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, reproduced by Hamas. For Mansur, the crisis was "the most brutal of aggressions led by the Christian and Zionist coalition full of hate toward our umma."

The communiqué of 13 August took the same line and highlighted the demands of the movement: "the withdrawal of American forces from Arab territory, which they have profaned, and the leaving of Arab affairs to the Arabs themselves." It demanded that "Iraq and Kuwait, brothers like all the Arab states, should work to resolve their problems between themselves," but it was not precise about the nature of the problem or an eventual Iraqi withdrawal.

Communiqué 63, on the other hand, elaborated upon the question of Kuwait, from the humanitarian as well as the political angle. "We here in Palestine, in the depth of torment, we feel better than anyone the bitterness of the loss of our homeland, the suffering of exodus and diaspora. . . . Our faithful Palestinian people do not forget the attitudes of goodwill and generosity taken by their brother Kuwaiti people toward the Palestinian people throughout their ordeal." However, Hamas was quick to add: "We are sure that our Iraqi brothers will grant to their Kuwaiti brothers the safety and protection of their persons, finances, belongings,

and liberties." This expectation that Iraq would treat the Kuwaitis justly was expressed, no doubt, for the benefit of Hamas' Gulf state benefactors—a placatory statement made all the more necessary by the obvious absence of compassion for the Kuwaitis on the Palestinian streets.

The political position detailed in the remainder of the tract seemed to ally Hamas more closely with the Gulf states and thus threatened to distance Hamas further from the Palestinians on the streets and from the Iraqi regime. For Hamas was, in fact, introducing new, balancing, demands. Now the demand for the withdrawal of foreign troops was accompanied by a demand for "the retreat of Iraqi troops from Kuwait," as well as for the "constitution of an Arab or Islamic [peace-keeping] force in hotly contested frontier regions." Hamas also called for:

> the people of Kuwait to have the right to determine the future of their country. Disputes [must] be settled within an Arab or Islamic framework, which would successfully carry out a study of Iraq's claims, whether it be a matter of referring to the drawing of frontiers or to the cancelling of debts from the war with Iran.

Communiqué 64 went on to reaffirm that the "Kuwaiti people should be able to exercise their right to self-determination and to selecting the regime of their choice."

Hamas, therefore, did not fully endorse Iraq's position, even if certain Iraqi claims were favorably regarded, nor did it completely align itself with Kuwait. The question of Palestine was always at the heart of the matter: "Our fight in the Gulf against the Crusade is our fight in Palestine against Zionism."[20] Thus, although continuing to hope for the destruction of Israel as a prerequisite of Palestine's liberation, Hamas did not appear to believe that Saddam Hussein would be the instrument of either. In its communiqué of 22 January 1991, for example, it acknowledged, "We rejoiced to see Arab weapons strike the bunkers of the Zionist enclave in the heart of Tel Aviv and elsewhere. The Jews will drink the same cup

which they have forced our people to drink everyday." Yet it had called on Iraq to "strike the heart of Tel Aviv" only if Iraq had become the victim of "Western, crusader-like aggression."[21]

These attitudes lead one to conclude that the Hamas command inside the occupied territories never considered a victory for Saddam Hussein a real possibility, but, rather, had its eye consistently on the postwar situation. There was always a need to be seen as not running against Palestinian public opinion; and, at the same time, it could not precipitate a cut-off of Gulf finances on which it was partly dependent. This latter concern was all the more important because Hamas' rival, the PLO, was bound to be weakened by its alignment with Iraq and the resultant loss of *its* Gulf revenues. While it is difficult to be precise about this financial linkage, certain estimates place the total amount of recent direct Kuwaiti financial aid to institutions in the occupied territories at approximately $100 million annually. At the Arab summit in Baghdad in 1990, Kuwait announced that it had paid $27 million to the PLO and $60 million to Hamas in the previous year. Over the past ten years, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have probably given $10 billion to the PLO.

Hamas' rather pragmatic attitude in the Gulf crisis was both a reaction to this financial history and a gamble on the future. Looking to the future is one indication that a movement is becoming increasingly organized and institutionalized; in the case of Hamas, forward thinking during the Gulf crisis was a sign, and a result, of the movement's enhanced legitimacy in the political life of the occupied territories due to its role in the recent history of the intifada. In perceiving the Gulf crisis as an opportunity to challenge the PLO for control of the Palestinian resistance movement, the leadership of Hamas seemed to be building on this momentum.

The Palestinian Future: Between the PLO and Hamas

At the end of the first year of the intifada in 1987, the nationalist camp seemed to be the victor. Basing himself on the claims of the UNLU to be directing the uprising, Yasser Arafat had succeeded in making his line prevail at a crucial meeting of the Palestine National Council: the proclamation of the State of Palestine on 15 November 1988 had been enthusiastically welcomed by the majority of Palestinians (even by those opposed to the policy of diplomacy rather than military struggle), while the acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 opened the way to a dialogue with the United States. The PLO, officially playing the American card for a diplomatic settlement, thus gave priority to the political need for a sharing of the land between two states—Israel and a truncated Palestine—over the emotional attachment of all Palestinians to an undivided Palestine. In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, it was understood that the uprising would continue with the same methods which had proved their effectiveness during the first year—that is, civil disobedience, rather than a policy of outright destruction of the enemy.

Hamas, which dominated the Islamic camp after the virtual eradication of Islamic Jihad, constituted henceforth the only organization opposing any negotiated solution and upholding the demand for the liberation of the whole of Palestine by armed struggle. After a thousand days of rebellion and in spite of undeniable gains, especially the break with the idea of a "normalized occupation," the nationalist, PLO camp found itself at a diplomatic and political impasse. Whereas the dynamism of the uprising was showing signs of flagging in the face of the immovability of both Israel and the international community, many people hoped for more radical methods. Serious, bloody events would provide Hamas with the opportunity to try to transform itself into the un-

disputed leader of the intifada.

In 1990, two years after the crucial meeting of the Palestine National Council in Algiers, the PLO approach had not succeeded. Not only was the state of Palestine still a quasi-fiction, but even the most favorable political interpretation of the uprising, which argued that at the least it would stimulate a new climate of negotiations, had been sabotaged. Israel refused to subscribe to the "Baker plan,"[22] and earlier both the Mubarak and Shamir plans had been stillborn.[23] The United States put an end to its dialogue with the PLO in June 1990, and, for its part, the United Nations showed itself to be incapable of enforcing its resolutions on the Palestinian question.

Parallel with these political setbacks, the situation in the occupied territories continued to deteriorate. A list compiled on 30 September 1990 showed 861 dead and 101,550 wounded since the beginning of the intifada. On 20 December 1990 the Israeli army acknowledged that, at one time or another, it had arrested around 70,000 Palestinians—that is, one-twentieth of the population. Furthermore, 65 people had been deported from the territories.

Economically, the situation at the time of the Gulf crisis was catastrophic, and it remains so. Per capita income is thought to have fallen by at least 35 percent since the beginning of the uprising and the possibilities of work in Israel grow fewer by the day. The number of holders of green identity cards, which forbid the holder to enter Israel, is, in fact, constantly increasing: before October 1990, some 3,400 inhabitants of the West Bank and 5,000 Palestinians from the Gaza Strip had been issued them; at the beginning of December 1990 security sources announced that at least 2,400 more would receive them in the West Bank alone.

At the same time, Israel's hold on the occupied territories tightened, particularly on Jerusalem, with the creation of new colonies outside and within the city and with the accelerated program of Jewish home-building in the old city. The massive immigration of 160,000 Soviet Jews in 1990 led

to a deepening of the Palestinians' fear of being swallowed up. In addition, the supporters of the policy of "transferring" the Palestinian population to the east bank of the Jordan saw General Rehavam Zeevi, one of their spokesmen, enter the Israeli government at the height of the Gulf war.

Alongside these external threats, internal tensions increased in 1990. The struggle against presumed "collaborators" intensified. According to Israeli army figures, 176 "collaborators" were executed by Palestinian groups in 1990, compared with 139 in 1989 and 16 in 1988.[24] Agreement has not been reached among the different Palestinian commands as to how to deal with those suspected of working closely with the Zionist authorities. Moreover, clashes have occurred between nationalists and Islamists on the one hand, and among various nationalist groups on the other. The tension in the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) outside of the occupied territories was echoed within the territories.[25] By the end of 1990 the top leaders of the Abd Rabbu wing were dismissed from their positions, only to be replaced by partisans of Nayef Hawatmeh.[26] The greatest tension occurred between the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which urged a radicalization of the methods of the intifada, and the other parties of the Unified National Leadership—a disagreement which led, in the spring of 1990, to a temporary alliance between the PFLP and the Islamists against planned municipal elections.[27]

Because of this infighting, the intifada might have lost its impetus entirely. But two events of exceptional gravity relaunched it and allowed Hamas to attempt to present itself as the natural leader of the intifada. First, on 20 May 1990, at Rishon Lezion (south of Tel Aviv), an Israeli killed seven Palestinian workers in cold blood and wounded about ten others. The repression of the demonstrations during the hours that followed resulted in seven more deaths and more than 500 wounded. Second, on 8 October, in the very heart of Jerusalem, on the esplanade of al-Haram al-Sharif—where the al-Aqsa mosque and Dome of the Rock are located and

near the spot Jews believe Solomon's temple once stood—clashes resulted in 21 Palestinian deaths and nearly 150 wounded. During the weeks that followed, curfews kept one million people in their homes while Israel refused to accept a United Nations investigative commission.

Immediately after the events at al-Aqsa, what very quickly became called "the war of the knives" began, with Jerusalem most often the theater. The Hamas command argued that "the massacre at al-Aqsa showed that our fight with Zionism is a fight between Islam and Judaism,"[28] but nonetheless kept legitimate targets restricted to soldiers and settlers. Simultaneously Hamas called for "the intensification of operations of jihad in the interior and overseas."[29] Several Israelis were stabbed, and the Israeli authorities resolved to move against Hamas. Four of its leaders were deported to Lebanon on 8 January 1991, and several hundred arrests were made in the ranks.

Hamas sought to elevate this "war of the knives" to the status of a new intifada strategy. However, the adherents of the PLO (with the exception of the PFLP) showed some hesitation as to whether they should support these activities, as a segment of Palestinian public opinion demanded, or condemn them, as world public opinion urged. What is clear is that the PLO was markedly on the defensive in the contest with Hamas for the Palestinian soul.

In the spring of 1990, Hamas made a number of demands on the PLO leadership, not the least of which was that there be a full return to "the military option" and that Hamas be given representation on the Palestine National Council commensurate with its strength on the ground. It estimated that it commanded the loyalty of forty to fifty percent of the population.[30] Needless to say, the PLO refused these demands and mounted a counter-attack. An editorial in the 8 July 1990 issue of *Filastin al-Thawra (Revolutionary Palestine)*, the journal of Fatah, accused Hamas of being the plaything of Israel and the United States and of intending to replace the PLO itself as leader of the Palestinian movement.[31] Clashes

between Hamas and Fatah, previously confined to the prisons, now occurred throughout the territories—in July 1990 at Rafah and in Gaza; in September, in Tulkarm, Burayj, and Jabalya camps and in Jenine. Refusing to alter its policy, Hamas again appeared to be the victor. On 19 September 1990, a reconciliation of sorts was agreed, whereby Fatah and Hamas undertook to coordinate orders to their followers and to set up committees in the prisons.[32] Yet in June 1991 new clashes erupted in Nablus and Gaza. A fundamentalist shot a PLO member in Nablus and then attacked him again on the operating table of the Anglican hospital. In Gaza, tension rose over Hamas' insistence that all women, including schoolgirls, wear the headscarf, or *hijab*. Slogans appeared on the walls which proclaimed, "Hamas considers the unveiled to be collaborators of a kind."[33]

In general, the contours of the larger picture remained the same after the Gulf war ended and Saddam Hussein was defeated. Hamas managed not to alienate popular support, while at the same time it refused to align itself with the Iraqi position. Combined with the increasing adoption of more radical methods of struggle against the occupation and the continuing failure of all efforts to resolve the Palestinian question, this skillfully calibrated Gulf policy brought Hamas new bases of support. In the weeks immediately after the war, it became clear that the PLO leadership was also in disarray. Weakened internationally because of its support of Saddam and deprived of its Gulf revenue, the PLO seemed paralyzed by new internal rivalries in its leadership and thus is unable to formalize a new policy. Indeed, the PLO's choice seemed stark: to stand aside before this pressure, or to resume its former, radical strategies. In either case Islamic fundamentalism, as represented by Hamas, would claim the political spoils that go to the victor.

Endnotes to Chapter 4

1. For detailed bibliographic references, see Jean-François Legrain, "The Islamic Movement and the Intifada," in Jamal Nassar and Roger Heacock, eds., *Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads* (New York: Praeger, 1990), pp. 175–90.
2. Jean-François Legrain, "Les élections étudiantes en Cisjordanie, 1978–1987" ("The Student Elections on the West Bank, 1978-1987"), *Egypte-Monde Arabe* 4(4)(1990). On the West Bank, the Muslim Brotherhood's lists greatly over-represent men and slightly under-represent the refugee camps. This contrasts with Fatah, which is especially rural and refugee-based, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which is urban and refugee-based. Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood is over-represented in the north and the south, unlike the Marxist groups which are concentrated in the center, but identical with Fatah. In Gaza, Brotherhood lists under-represent the camps (the opposite of the PFLP and Fatah) and over-represent the north (the opposite of Fatah).
3. Made up solely of a few commando-cells (some on the West Bank) and small groups from the Islamic University of Gaza but without any real network, the Jihad gained its best university score in Gaza as soon as it entered the contest (January 1983), receiving almost 20 percent of the votes. Like the Muslim Brotherhood on the West Bank, the Jihad afterwards experienced a strong setback and did not begin its climb upward again until just before the uprising. Its candidates, almost exclusively men, accentuate the tendencies already observed in the Muslim Brotherhood—a slight over-representation of non-refugees and strong representation of the Gaza region.
4. Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising—Israel's Third Front* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990); Jean-François Legrain and Pierre Chenard, *Les voix du soulèvement palestinien: Edition critique et traduction française des communiqués du Commandement National Unifié et du Mouvement de la Résistance Islamique 1987-1988. (Voices of the Palestinian Uprising: Critical Edition and French Translation of the Communiqués of the Unified National Command and of the Movement of Islamic Resistance)* (Cairo: Centre d'études et de documentation economique, juridique et sociale [CEDEJ], 1991).
5. Its leaders were deported from the occupied territories at the beginning of 1988.
6. Its mouthpiece is *Islam wa Filastin (Islam and Palestine)*, published in France but based in the United States and Cyprus.
7. This movement has fabricated a past for itself, which seems not to be based on fact: for example, its claims to having made attacks against Israeli buses near Ismailia on 9 February 1990, and near Eilat on 25 November 1990, have been challenged by security sources.
8. In the occupied territories Hamas has published its own, thirty-six page version of its history, *Fi'l-Dhikra al-Thaniyya li'l-Intilaqa; Hamas, Ishraqat Amal fi Sama' Filastin (On the Occasion of the Second Anniversary of the Uprising, Hamas Sparkles with Hope in the Sky of Palestine)*, 9 December 1989. See also *Filastin al-Muslima (Muslim Palestine)*, unofficial organ of the movement published in Great Britain.

9. Communiqué 67 of 13 August 1990, Communiqué 63 of 29 August 1990, and Communiqué 64 of 26 September 1990.
10. For instance, Communiqués 65, of 11 October 1990, and 66 of 31 October 1990, are almost entirely concerned with the events in Jerusalem on 8 October near al-Aqsa mosque and the Temple Mount. Communiqué 68 of 17 December 1990, is entirely concentrated on the repression directed against Hamas. It is not until 22 January 1991, that a communiqué concerning the war was issued.
11. Communiqué 64 of 26 September 1990.
12. Communiqué of 22 January 1991.
13. Declaration of 5 August 1991, of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood.
14. Communiqué 63 of 29 August 1990.
15. Communiqué 66 of 31 October 1990.
16. Ibid.
17. Communiqué 62 of 13 August 1990.
18. Declaration of 5 August 1990.
19. Unlike *Filastin al-Muslima* which, several times, speaks of Iraqi "aggression" (*ghazu*).
20. Communiqué 63.
21. Communiqué 62.
22. On 10 October 1989, the American State Department, using the Israeli plan of 14 May 1989 as a basis, announced propositions in 5 points. The main provision was for a meeting in Cairo between Palestinian and Israeli delegations, but preparatory dialogue broke down over the presence of Palestinians from outside the occupied territories.
23. The Mubarak plan specified that all the Palestinians in the occupied territories (including the residents of Jerusalem) should be able to take part in elections—a necessary step toward the adoption of a definitive settlement of the Palestinian question. The Shamir plan, urged by the United States, proposed the election of an "intermediary to lead the negotiations toward an interim period of autonomy" in the course of which "negotiations with a view to reaching a permanent settlement would be undertaken" to achieve peace "between Israel and Jordan." The plan opposed the establishment of a "supplementary Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and in the territories situated between Israel and Jordan," and it excluded the PLO from the negotiations. In July 1990, Yitzhak Shamir excluded the inhabitants of Jerusalem from the process, refused to prohibit further construction of Israeli settlements, and insisted on the end of the uprising before elections could take place.
24. *The Jerusalem Post*, 1 January 1991.
25. Paul Lalor, "DFLP Differences Reflect the Debate Within the PLO," *Middle East International* (27 April 1990): 17–19.
26. Replaced were the heads of the women's union and of the association of trade-unionists.
27. Conflict occurred between Fatah and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) in Askar camp at the end of June 1990, and between the DFLP and the Palestine Communist Party at Idhna at the beginning of July 1990. For information on the municipal elections, see Joel Greenberg,

"Marxists and Moslem Fundamentalists in Areas Join Move against Fatah," *The Jerusalem Post*, 2 April 1990.

28. Communiqué 66.
29. Communiqué 67, also see unnumbered special communiqué of 16 December 1990.
30. Memorandum of 6 April 1990, to Shaikh Abd al-Hamid al-Sa'ih, president of the Palestine National Council. This body has around 550 members (among whom are 186 representatives of the occupied territories who are forbidden to participate by Israel). Only 5 Islamists have a place on the Council at present: Abd al-Rahman al-Hawrani and Abdullah Abu Izza, who also belong to the Central Council of the PLO; Amin Agha, Ahmad Salim Najm, and Jamal Hasan Ayish.
31. This editorial received a reply in *al-Sabil* (*The Way*), reproduced in *Filastin al-Muslima*, September 1990, pp. 14–15.
32. The text is reproduced in *Filastin al-Muslima*, October 1990, p. 4.
33. *The Independent*, 5 June 1991.

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